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Abstract
Social insurance schemes have proved to be rather stable welfare state
institutions enjoying broad popular support. It is widely assumed that the
high degree of legitimacy is due to the insurance analogy because those
schemes provide individually equitable returns on prior contribution
payments. In this article it is demonstrated that all social insurance
schemes contain interpersonal redistributions on a large scale, resulting
from uniform contribution rates, provisions geared at social adequacy of
benefits, and unequal treatment of different birth cohorts. In Germany,
those redistributive elements are most pronounced in the statutory health
care scheme. It is argued that the unchallenged functioning of social
insurances is dependent on a prevailing culture of solidarity. It denotes
an immunity to the temptation of individual utility maximization based
upon recognized moral duties which then facilitates ongoing redistributive
processes. Results from qualitative interviews with persons insured with
the German statutory health care scheme clearly indicate the presence of
those solidary virtues. The continued existence of this moral
infrastructure appears to be less threatened by progressing individualiza-
tion. Rather, it might be eroded by current political attempts to shift the
balance between solidarity and self-reliance which intensify mistrust in
the permanence of comprehensive health care protection.
Contents
1.Introduction 5
2.Principles and Characteristics of Social Insurance Schemes 7
- Demarcations and justifications 7
- Employment-centeredness 9
- Employers' interest and the status of the beneficiary 10
- Ex ante redistribution 14
- Interpersonal redistribution for the sake of social adequacy 15
- Intergenerational redistributions 17
3.Health Insurance Is Different and Even More Ambitious 19
4.Health Care Insurance - the Attitudes of the Insured 24
5.Conclusion 30
References 33
51. Introduction
Social insurance schemes are ingenious constructions. In general, this social
technology has been quite successful in reducing the distressing
consequences of (typical) market risks of wage labor and enjoys broad support
among the insured. It could be applied to various social contingencies, and,
once introduced, social insurance schemes have proved to be politically stable
and highly "path dependent" welfare state institutions. Almost nowhere they
have been abandoned completely. Rather, political reforms have left their
basic principles untouched. And while retaining their institutional structure
those schemes have been flexible enough as to broaden coverage, to increase
initially exiguous benefit levels, and to extend and differentiate entitlement
criteria. This paper deals with those basic principles, their contribution to the
lasting stability and support of social insurance schemes, and under which
conditions these "arks of continuity" could possibly run into jeopardy.
   Beside a few other welfare states of continental Europe (Austria, Belgium,
France or Italy), Germany can be characterized as the "social insurance state"
par excellence: About 40 percent of the general government's outlays is caused
by the various social insurance schemes, and roughly two thirds of total social
expenditure (according to national calculations) are made up by these
schemes. This amounted to more than one fifth of GNP in 1994 what signifies
their substantial impact on the economy.
   Very often, the roots and the road taken toward a "social insurance state"
are associated with
Bismarck's name. However, as an element of the state-building process the
original "Bismarck approach" was different (cf. Hunkel 1909; Hentschel 1983:
11-29.): Instead of functionally different organizations a unified agency should
hand out largely tax-financed benefits to the "soldiers of work". Nevertheless,
social insurance legislation in Germany during the 1880s influenced other
European countries' social security development albeit the process of
"transnational learning" was definitely not a one-to-one adoption of the
German model, rather, only certain elements were carried over. And in other
countries, after sometimes thorough consideration, the "German" approach
was outright rejected due to different cultural and political traditions, so-
cio-economic circumstances and/or administrative capacities, and a
completely different design for nationalizing social security was chosen instead
(Ritter 1989: 86-101; Henning 1991 - both with further references).
   The German and other welfare states of the European continent have been
classified as be-
longing to the "corporatist-conservative" cluster (Esping-Andersen 1990). This
label contains the connotation of "backwardness" whereas the
"socialdemocratic" welfare states, based on citizenship, being more ambitious
for redistribution, and achieving a higher degree of de-commodification,
appear to be the more "modern" variant.1 In the following I want to show
that, although most pure tax-transfer schemes require a higher tolerance
for interpersonal redistributions, social insurances, based on contributory
financing, are far from being unambitious in this respect: Their aims and
effects stretch beyond an undemanding consolidation of unequal market
results and preservation of the attained status differences. These
redistributive properties are only inadequately grasped by Esping-Ander-
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"stratification". In his analysis the impact of internal, non-actuarial
balancing in social insurances is underestimated as are, in consequence,
the requirements on part of the contributors to acquiesce in those pro-
cesses.
   My argument is that the broad support for and, hence, the political
stability of these welfare state institutions are dependent on and indeed
rest upon a culture of solidarity. It denotes an immunity to the temptation
of individual utility maximization, based upon recognized moral, not just
effective legal (and hence, in essence, contingent) duties. To a large
extent, this moral infrastructure is the result of formative side-effects on
part of the insured due to the lasting existence of those schemes because,
like other successful institutions, they perform a "socializing function" in
that they generate and cultivate congruent cognitive and moral standards
(Offe 1996). The cultural legacy of embodied solidarity norms and their
continuous validation are central to the institutional "character" of social
insurance schemes. In contrast, all private insurances pursuing an
actuarially fair treatment of their policy holders can do without a culture
of solidarity. Therefore, its prevalence is especially imperative for the
legitimacy of a statutory health care insurance, like the German, where
substantial non-actuarial redistributions in various dimensions are
taking place. The main thesis of this paper is that progressive individu-
alization and emerging mistrust in the continuity of this centerpiece of the
German welfare state could possibly lead to a waning of that
underpinning of loyalty, and political attempts to reconstruct and partly
privatize this scheme would be eased after it has lost its plausibility and
attraction.
   In the next section (2.) I will outline central principles and
characteristics of social insurance schemes, demonstrate their
consonance with the functioning of a market economy and the insured
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interpersonal redistribution inherent to social insurances. In establishing
those redistributions the features of private insurance are used as a
1      This largely negative valuation of the social insurance approach is
C1D6EGFDHEJI6EKMLMN#KOQPRNSK)TVUGF1FXWﬂY[Z\!]^R_`Ra -1) earlier characterization of the "industrial
achievement-performance" model of social policy as a "handmaiden" model
because social insurances mainly "insure" for or reproduce (labor) market
inequalities (see also Marshall 1992: 102, 121, 141; Heimann 1929/1980:
241-9; for a critique of this perspective see Leisering 1995).
yardstick. It will become clear that it is necessary to differentiate between
branches of social insurance or the risks they cover. Thus, the points of
reference in the second section are mainly old-age/disability and unem-
ployment insurance schemes. In the third section the focus is narrowed
to statutory health care insurance in Germany. It covers a "special" risk,
provides foremost benefits in-kind, and is considerably more ambitious
with regard to solidary virtues. In the fourth section I will present results
from (primarily) qualitative interviews conducted with persons insured
with the German statutory health insurances schemes in order to evalu-
ate the prevalence of a "culture of solidarity". Finally, I will point to some
developments that could gradually erode this moral infrastructure on
which a social insurance state rests.
2. Principles and Characteristics of Social Insurance Schemes
-  Demarcations and justifications
Private insurances and social insurance schemes have in common that
occurrence of a specified risk event causes a flow of predictable benefits if
the insured person meets certain eligibility criteria - foremost, having paid
premia or contributions previously. The benefits are granted without
"demonstrated need" (ascertained by a means test) as a matter of right,
either conditioned by a private insurance contract or, in case of social
insurance, due to the legal specification of the "conditions governing
eligibility, and the nature and amount of the benefit" (Burns 1949: 31).
Thus, private and social insurance benefits are paid to poor and affluent
claimants alike.
   However, there are two decisive differences: First, insurance with a
certain scheme or type of social insurance scheme is universally
compulsory or, at least, mandatory for selected sub-groups of the
collectivity (while others are legally excluded or may join voluntarily on
special terms). Therefore, the compulsorily insured have no individual
discretion to decide on the amount and the terms of the assigned
protection: Both, contributions and benefits are politically fixed. Second,
in social insurance schemes no individualized, experience-rated risk
premium is levied, rather, a uniform contribution (rate) unrelated to the
risk status is applied for all members of the insured collectivity.2 Because
of this risk pooling without risk classification, contributory social
insurance is not merely "insurance" with only ex post redistribution
occurring or simple intertemporal reshuffling of life-time income.3
2      Where experience rating takes place it is limited to contributions solely paid
by employers on behalf of their workers as is the case with accident insurance
in Germany or unemployment insurance in the United States.
3      This and the following paragraph draw on Atkinson 1991 and 1993; Barr
   These characteristics of social insurances follow from the rationale why
the state, for reasons of efficiency and social justice, intervenes in the
protection against certain economic contingencies and sets up those
(quasi-)public organizations. Regularly, explanations and justifications of
social insurance legislation follow from (private insurance and capital)
market failure arguments (myopia, adverse selection, protecting the
prudent, merit goods, etc.). Furthermore, since the probability of earnings
loss due to unemployment cannot be statistically calculated beforehand
and is not independent across insured individuals, virtually, no private
unemployment insurance could work.4 And, beside "uninsurable risks",
benefits provided by private insurers can hardly be protected against
unanticipated inflation or be index-linked to have actual beneficiaries
participating in real income growth. This is a most important issue of
old-age security (Barr 1993: 195-8 and 216-7; Berthold 1988). Finally, a
"monopolistic" and publicly organized and regulated agency needs not to
burden their insured with marketing costs and profits. It can, at least in
principle, operate at low administrative expenses due to large scale and
standardization and is, different from private insurances, not exposed to
the threat of economic failure (Beveridge 1942: 277-86; Bismarck, cited in
Hunkel 1909: 56-7; Thompson 1994: 8-9). The last aspect is notably
important for a retire-
ment program which has to bridge a very long time-span and hence
requires durability as well as flexibility (de Swaan 1988: 179-81).5
1993 (especially Ch. 4-5 and 7-9); Thompson 1983. Thompson (1994: 4-6) also
lists various elements to be included in a definition of "social insurance".
4      Therefore, even public unemployment insurance schemes occupy a special
position within the social insurance system: Almost everywhere they are
centralized schemes in order to balance occupational and regional differences in
the national unemployment rate. Furthermore, they are protected from
becoming overtaxed due to high and lasting unemployment and large numbers
of long-term unemployed: Most schemes in EU countries provide for subsidies
out of tax revenues and have a second tier of tax-financed (means-tested)
benefits foremost for the long-term unemployed and others who are not or no
longer eligible for unemployment insurance benefits (Europäische Kommission
1996: 346-65). In Germany, the unemployment insurance does not belong to
the social insurance system in the narrow sense: Those sections of the Basic
Law (Grundgesetz, sections 74 and 120) referring to "social insurances"
separately mention "unemployment insurance" (see also section 4 SGB
[Sozialgesetzbuch] I and section 1 SGB IV). This borderline position also shows
up in the German Employment Promotion Act which lays down that the
contributory principle applies both to unemployment benefits and measures of
active labor market policies: The "insured" are called "persons liable to
contributions" (beitragspflichtige Personen), whereas in the laws on the public
pension scheme and statutory health insurance the term is "compulsorily
insured persons" (versicherungspflichtige Personen).
5      Those arguments in favor of state intervention and public organization of
social insurance schemes are not undisputed (see e.g. Berthold 1988; World
   However, compulsory insurance is required not only to have the
potentially imprudent making their contribution but also if the state, for
reasons of setting up a social insurance, aspires to have low-risk groups
contributing to the benefits of high-risk groups.6 A uniform contribution
(rate) results in an ex ante redistribution in favor of the risk-prone
members when one unit of benefit has the same (average) "price"
irrespective of individual risk status and, hence, makes insurance
participation affordable for the high-risk individuals (without granting
them tax-financed subsidies). This type of interpersonal redistribution
(and others as well, see below) can take place only if the low-risk groups
are denied the chance to opt out and take out private insurance contracts
where mainly ex post redistribution occurs.7
-  Employment-centeredness
Regularly, compulsory membership of a social insurance scheme and the
payment of contributions to that scheme is dependent on the engagement
in certain economic activities - mainly earning an income from
employment. Although very often self-employed persons are compelled to
partake in social insurance schemes, originally, they were introduced to
secure (industrial) workers against typical economic contingencies
associated with wage labor, and employees still represent the point of
reference for the political acknowledgement and institutional
transformation of social risks. Those typical contingencies were
associated with a "pre-
sumptive need" for income replacement and/or in-kind benefits, and the
spreading of wage labor under industrial capitalism contributed to the
necessary standardization of risk events. Hence, the labor market is not
Bank 1994).
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term ... implies both that it is compulsory and that men stand together with
their fellows", i.e. that "none should claim to pay less because he is healthier or
has more regular employment" (1942: 13; see also Marshall 1975: 55-6).
7      Ex post redistribution in private insurances denotes the difference between
the premia calculated according statistical probabilities ("experience rating")
and the factual occurrence of the insured risk event. It is inherent in any
insurance when e.g. in a health care insurance those who fell sick receive
benefits while insured who remained healthy do not. De facto, most private
insurances contain redistribution which stretches beyond pure ex post
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determining the respective premium accordingly is impracticable. Instead,
individuals sharing certain risk qualities are combined in risk classes, and it
depends on the homogeneity of the members of one and the same risk class to
what extent ex ante redistribution takes place among them (see e.g. Titmuss
1974: 87-101; Eisen 1980: 539-41).
only regulated by labor laws aiming at the preservation of the
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(substitutional or supplementary) public transfers. Complementary to
these measures of protecting earnings (capacity), compulsory social
insurance schemes confer on the voluntary labor contract between private
actors a public status because the labor contract is the legal foundation
for enforced contribution payments to as well as for the subsequent
entitlements to benefits from social insurance schemes. Thus, the private
labor contract is joined by the state as a "third partner" (see also Marshall
1975: 54-5).
   The employment-centeredness of social insurance schemes entails an
enforced solidarity of the actually employed with those members of the
risk collectivity who are permanently or temporarily out of employment.
Therefore, solidarity is also exclusive: Only those persons who have not
always been poor or outside gainful employment and have made prior
contributions are entitled to benefits from the solidarity funds when they
are presumed to be in need.8 These recipients have passed the "eye of a
needle" of covered employment and, thus, had been at pains to provide for
themselves and their families.9 This condition establishes a moral
difference between social insur-
ance beneficiaries and the recipients of tax-financed welfare, i.e. it
separates the "respectable workers" having property-like claims from the
"less eligible" others.
-  Employers' interests and the status of the beneficiary
Among other reasons, it is this (exaggerated) distinction why, apart from
the petty bourgeoisie in the beginning, employers, by and large, have not
opposed attempts to collectivize the typical risks of wage labor (de Swaan
1988:
167-71). If one leaves aside the original "Beveridge approach" of flat-rate
contributions for uniform benefits, almost all social insurance schemes
providing cash benefits are based on earnings-related contributions, and
benefits are linked to previous (life- (3":B	
  ( 2ﬂ  9ﬁﬃﬂ (3 ﬂ ings.
Hence, it could be assumed that social insurance schemes would not run
8      On the problem of confining social insurance to persons who are both in
need of protection against social risks and able to provide for those states of
need, see Eveline Burns, quoted in Perrin 1984: 410 (n. 68) and Perrin 1984:
402-8.
9      Beside own employment there is only one further route to attain access to
benefits, namely, receiving "derivative" benefits by virtue of being a dependent
family member of a formerly or presently insured person (see below). Therefore,
social insurance schemes are also "marriage-centered" (Hinrichs 1996; cf.
Esping-Andersen 1996).
counter to the industrial work ethic, rather, would promote the "telescopic
faculty" (Alfred Marshall) of a not yet "modernized" and "domesticated"
working class and the establishment of a deferred gratification pattern.
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engage in con-
tinuous, disciplined and dependent employment as a life-long necessity,
the ascertained expectation (Erwartungssicherheit) to be protected against
the vicissitudes connected with wage labor is undoubtedly conducive to
the motivation for industrial work. Insofar, "de-commodification"
represents an advantage for employers that has not to be wrested from
them against their consent (Lenhardt/Offe 1977).
   The fact that in most social insurance schemes the employers
participate in the financing of social insurance contributions can be
regarded as documenting "respon  " G"#ﬁﬃ":( 2* ﬃ  ()@"#   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obligation to pay their mandated share of contributions:10 Due to their
predominantly compensatory objectives social insurance schemes
externalize social risks, and they nationalize solutions for those problems
at a calculable and equal (and, in the beginning, low) price for all
competing employers.11 This results in increased productivity. In addition,
collectible wage replacement benefits open up the opportunity to get rid of
surplus workers and no longer or less productive (disabled/older)
10      It is obvious that these liabilities represent withhold wages which, together
with levied em
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occurence. And it is no longer contested that employers only pay the
contributions falling to them. Actually, they do not bear these contributions
(implying squeezed profits) although the ultimate incidence of this direct tax on
employment is hard to ascertain. Generally, it is assumed that there is a
variable mixture of shifting them backward to wages and forward shifting to
product prices, depending on which market is "weaker" (Groser 1994). Despite
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bution rates imply a mandated increase of total wage costs determined outside
collective bargaining, and employers face the challenge to either have this
increment being taken into account during subsequent bargaining rounds or
accomplish correspondingly higher product prices at the market. A third
alternative to offset the cost increase is to enhance labor-saving rationalization
measures. Then it would drop back on labor as well - in a selective fashion due
to more redundancies.
11      In Germany, it was foremost the fact that employers and employees
completely or largely financed the social insurance schemes via contributions
which qualified them to participate in decision-making and established the
principle of self-administration by representatives of employers and employees
(tripartism, including state representatives, is only in force at the board of the
unemployment insurance system). This feature was not so much an outflow of
the corporatist tradition. Today, the scope for autonomous decisions of the
self-administrative bodies is rather narrow. They are subordinated to legal
interventions (Wertenbruch 1981).
employees without encountering serious social conflicts.12 An advantage
for the economy as a whole is that the nationalization of social security
helps to establish a national labor market and, thus, enhances
growth-promoting labor mobility while not forestalling the strategic
development of internal labor markets by additional employer-sponsored
programs.
   It is contributory financing as such that permits social insurance
benefits to be higher than the means-tested minimum level, and the
earnings-relatedness of contributions justifies differential benefit levels to
protect accustomed standards of living (if, in principle, the original
hierarchy of market wages is considered legitimate). Mandated payments
"irrespective of the means of the contributor" (Beveridge 1942: 12)
distinguish contributions from (progressive income) taxes. And this social
insensibility generates "a claim to benefits irrespective of means"
(Beveridge 1942: 12, cf. 107-8) because individual gross earnings without
any exemptions, (family) allowances or other manipulations to be applied
in any income tax system represent the sole basis for the capacity to pay
a proportional contribution rate. If the benefits correspond to the
principle of individual equity they are "earned" at any level and materialize
as "deferred wages", immune from political discretion. This
conceptualization gives rise to question whether it is actually appropriate
to classify social insurance expenditure as "public social spending":
Whereas taxes are clearly forced income reductions, social insurance con-
tributions can be conceived as mandated income utilization which, in
functional perspective, are not different from (additional) private provi-
sions against certain risks by intertemporal shifting of life-time income
(TEK 1981: 42-4).13
   But social insurance benefits not only can be higher than assistance
benefits, they also have to exceed them and, furthermore, have to be
differentiated according to previous earnings in order not to interfere with
the incentive structure of the labor market and established wage
inequalities: If workers follow the presumed normalcy of the life-course
implying continuous work according to standard conditions under the
premise that it maximizes the life-time return then it has to pay off (while
"cheating" through illicit work does not): "otherwise the insured persons
12      Especially during the last decade externalizing strategies of employers to
refer substantial parts of the labor force to various pathways to social insurance
benefits (foremost early retirement) have resulted in collective moral hazard so
that, via an impaired beneficiary/worker ratio, they are now confronted with
higher contribution rates (see also Esping-Andersen 1996).
13      In order to generate broad popular support for the old-age insurance
program (OASI) enacted in 1935, U.S. Social Security Administration was eager
to promote an ideology and evocative semantic that it was analogous to private
insurance (Derthick 1979: 198-205).
get nothing for their contributions" (Beveridge 1942: 141).14 The perspec-
tive to be deserved to more than (means-test) minimum benefits and
indeed to be granted a higher benefit level subsequently has four effects:
(1) It makes wage labor and the endeavor to attain higher earnings more
attractive. (2) It adjudges to the recipients of social insurance benefits a
non-stigmatizing, reputable status.15 (3) The appeal of graduated benefits
in return for earnings-related contributions renders possible the ready
incorporation of the wage-dependent middle classes as the higher
contributions they pay to these schemes prove to be beneficial to them as
well.16 (4) This leads, for the sake of legitimacy and broadening the ranks
of "defenders", to a "waste" of public transfers: Necessarily, "social
insurance states" have a larger welfare expenditure volume than
countries which rely on a (lax) targeting approach and tax-financing, like
Australia or New Zealand (Castles/Mitchell 1992).
   In sum, social insurance schemes, combining legislated obligations and
individual responsibility, seem to be morally undemanding and should be
well protected against popular discontent if the following institutional
properties apply (Offe 1990: 180-5): Earmarked contributions are paid into
separate funds. The contributors are assured that these revenues are
spent on designed purposes only and shielded from the govern 4(?  
appropriation. They can also be sure that benefits are exclusively
restricted to persons who have previously demonstrated their willingness
and ability to engage in covered employment and have not triggered those
"event-conditional transfers" due to individual misbehavior. Compulsory
insurance as well as the state control and guarantee of the arrangements
 ()87(3@ ()@4 ":  >4$  %ﬂ" dence that their claims to benefits will
actually be met at some time or other in the future. And the close tie-up
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these are always equitable returns. In Germany, the public pension
scheme comes closest to this "ideal" of mandatory (or "heteronomous")
self-help because, of all branches of social insurance, it is most "insur-
ance-like".
   But contributory social insurances are not private insurance programs
14      This has in fact happened in Britain: An ever larger number of previous
contributors to National Insurance receives benefits (much) lower than the
means-tested assistance level (Alcock 1996).
15      cf. Kohli 1987; Beveridge 1942: 11. For a list of characteristics conducive
to low political conflict potential of social security systems, see Øyen 1986.
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I1K -rate logic of treating alike "the poorer man and the richer
man" (1942: 108) is less attractive to the middle classes since a uniform cash
benefit provides no status maintenance. On the other hand, the "poorer man"
paying the same contribution becomes overburdened if the benefits are fixed at
a level factually sufficient to meet minimum needs and if they are supposed to
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run by the government, rather, do combine the concepts of commutative
justice and distributive justice (Zacher 1987: 592-3). They are a matter of
"political risk balancing" (Lauer-Kirschbaum/Rüb 1994: 44) when certain
deficient life-situations are considered as socially conditioned and
individually non-manageable, are politically acknowledged to be
compensated, and, hence, are legally furnished with typified entitlements
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integration. Thus, political (and not: actuarial) risk balancing via social
insurance schemes includes deliberate interpersonal redistribution on the
revenue (contribution) side as well as on the expenditure (benefit) side.
But these institutions which, in the first place, produce solidarity by
compulsory membership cannot provide net benefits for all members at
any time. Thus, because sheer self-interest will not do their long-term
feasibility, hence, hinges upon the familiarized recognition of social norms
and redistributive principles embedded in the formal (legal) rules of the
respective scheme, i.e. a moral infrastructure that supplies them with
legitimacy.
-  Ex ante redistribution
Ex ante redistributions emanating from uniform contribution rates (see
above) are taking place in both the horizontal and vertical dimension.17
Those processes need not to be outright "offensive" if different risk classes
according to age (of entry), health status, sex (= different longevity and
morbidity), (non-)hazardous working conditions etc. are not taken into
account, rather, all insured are assumed to bear an equal ("average") risk.
However, disregarding risk differentials of which everyone knows that
they are indeed important make up the cognitive element of a moral effort
when low-risk individuals who would fare better with no insurance at all
or a private insurance based on experience rating are called on to solidar-
ity payments. To put up with this demand without complaining and not
trying to individually or collectively escape compulsory insurance
G%ﬂB  ﬂ>4& (,"#4 ﬁﬃ ": '&   own risk is assessed to be permanently
below average or, what would be a principal-agent problem, other insured
can be suspected to deliberately induce the risk event that triggers a flow
of benefits. The possibilities for "moral hazard" are virtually absent in
schemes providing old-age or disability pensions. A birth certificate or
unbiased medical expertise clearly substantiate the entitlement (if further
provable requirements are fulfilled as well).
   But sickness and notably unemployment insurance are different:
Sickness insurance provides workers with "a modicum of discretionary
17      An example: In a public pension scheme the high risk (sic) of women
having a greater life expectancy mainly results in horizontal redistribution
whereas the lower longevity of the lower social strata entails vertical
redistribution.
choice as to whether to work or to pursue al-
ternative activities" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 154). Medical certification,
waiting days and other means are thus applied not only to discourage
workers from malingering ("krankfeiern") but also to assure the prudent
that their contributions are properly spent. Whereas the risk to fall ill or
to become disabled is universal, the threat of actually becoming
unemployed can be (nearly) ruled out by large segments of the work force.
It means that, in contrast to a public pension scheme, an unemployment
insurance is not potentially beneficial for the entire insured population.
Moreover and independent of the factual incidence, it is widely assumed
that unemployment is often self-inflicted and its duration consciously
prolonged due to the access to benefits. Therefore, of all social security
programs it is unemployment insurance which (beside social assistance)
generally enjoys the lowest popular support (see e.g. Papadakis/Bean
1993: 234-6; Roller 1996). Again, work tests, low replacement ratios (in
most countries considerably lower than prevalent in other branches of the
social insurance system), and a short duration of benefit eligibility are
used to combat moral hazard behavior as well as to remove the
misgivings of the regularly employed that funds are spent on people not
"like us" (Sanders 1988).
-  Interpersonal redistribution for the sake of social adequacy
Almost all redistributions taking place within social insurance schemes
are interpersonal even if merely aims of intertemporal shifting of
resources were pursued, e.g. from the young to the old or from the
healthy to the sick. But only accidentally do benefits correspond to the
principle of actuarial fairness: Most social insurance schemes providing
cash benefits are "defined-benefit plans" where neither varying contribu-
tion rates during previous covered employment nor the total amount of
prior contributions are taken into account, and, very often, the time when
contributions were paid is relevant only as to whether benefit eligibility
actually exists. Different from private schemes, the level and stratification
of benefits are unrelated to contributions. Their payment merely
establishes individual entitlements and serves the purpose to balance the
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persons or the preceding generation. Only the underlying (and somehow
indexed) earnings record matters when (inflation-proofed or otherwise
adjusted) benefits are computed. And the standard replacement ratios
and respective deviations thereof are politically fixed according to
sometimes conflicting judgements on appropriateness, proper incentives,
financial viability, etc.18 These distortions of actuarial fairness alone do
18      Regularly, in old-age and disability insurance programs the benefit level is
determined by (1) the assessed income, (2) the length of the contribution period,
and (3) the accrual factor (OECD 1988: 67-74). In unemployment and sickness
not contradict the conception of individual equity if the link between prior
earnings and benefit level remains identifiable so that the image (and
popularity) of a quasi-contractual relationship - "prepaid" benefits on a
quid pro quo basis - can be sustained.
   However, almost all benefit formulas and eligibility rules contain
provisions aimed at social adequacy of benefits levels. They moderate the
principle of individual equity, and by altering the structure of benefit
claims the state is relieved from direct redistributive efforts by means of
tax revenues. A few examples might suffice to demonstrate the incidence
of these intragenerational redistributions which in Germany are labelled
as "sozialer Ausgleich" (social balancing): Due to the progressive benefit
formula applied in the U.S. public pension scheme a relatively greater
percentage of average lifetime earnings is replaced for low-wage workers
than for high-wage earners, and noncontributory family supplements
result in higher benefit levels for couples (with children) than for singles
(in Germany, the replacement rate for the unemployed depends on the
presence of children). Likewise, the German public pension scheme
contains various provisions which result in horizontal as well as in
vertical redistributions (in both directions), e.g. credits for child care and
periods spent in formal education or military service, the upgrading of low
earnings, or less than actuarially fair benefit deductions in case of early
retirement. The same is true for the Swedish superannuation scheme
which, among others, has been particularly beneficial for working women
so far (Ståhlberg 1990, with further references). Furthermore, almost all
old-age insurance programs include survi

 -  Jﬃ"ﬃ()  ;4(,@>4  ;<4() "ﬃﬁ:"#47 
different total benefit return from individually equal contributions
depending on marital status.19
   Again, those distortions of a strict, although not actuarial connection
between contributions and benefits need not to be offensive. Notably
horizontal redistributions in favor of families should not give rise to
substantial discontent because the situation whether one is positively or
negatively affected regularly changes during a "normal" life-course. But
vertical redistributions for the sake of socially adequate benefit levels
demand forbearance of contributors whose returns (replacement rates)
are accordingly lower. Scholars of public finance argue that due to the
insurance the length of the contribution period plays no or a less significant
role if a minimum period necessary to qualify is accomplished.
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benefits for family members (see below) represent an element of an extended ex
ante redistribution and not of social adequacy. For conceptual reasons I prefer
to stick to the distinction: Ex ante redistribution refers to the revenue side
whereas redistributions aimed at social adequacy relate to the benefit side, and
intergenerational redistributions (see below) combine both sides. - For an
overview of provisions in social insurance schemes of EU member countries
which imply the interpersonal redistributions discussed in this section, see
Europäische Kommission 1996.
equivalence principle the resistance against (rising) contributions is
significantly lower than against (higher) taxes, and a perceptible
weakening of the insurance analogy would endanger this definite
advantage of social insurance institutions (Mackscheidt 1985; cf.
Beveridge 1942: 11-2 and 119). At the same time, the status of certain
recipients of social insurance benefits is injured because they have not
"earned" their benefits (completely). Finally, extensive interpersonal
redistributions within those schemes imply higher than otherwise
necessary contribution rates, possibly resulting in allocative distortions
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are increased.
   Therefore, it has been demanded to completely finance benefits or
benefit elements which stretch beyond the principle of individual equity
out of the general tax revenue, either within social insurance schemes (via
subsidies) or outside as distinct benefits (Mackscheidt 1985; Schmähl
1995) although the concrete definition of those benefits
(versicherungsfremde Leistungen) has always been disputed (TEK 1981:
246-9). Such a regrouping would not alter the status of certain
beneficiaries. However, it would be conducive to the legitimacy of contrib-
utory financing, reduce the contribution rates, and to summon all
taxpayers could be justified for distributional ends. In Germany, those
demands have received much political attention after unification when the
volume of benefits "alien" to social insurances but not covered by
corresponding federal subsidies increased substantially (Hinrichs 1995b:
662-3).
   These arguments refer to a tradeoff which has been discussed at length
in the United States with regard to the precarious balance of the
competing principles of individual equity and social adequacy inherent in
Social Security (see e.g. Brown 1977; Meyer/Wolff 1993; Thompson
1983): Giving clear priority to the first principle keeps resistance of both
workers and employers against contribution payments low and makes
plain the obligation to self-help. But it results in benefit levels not always
surpassing poverty thresholds and gives rise to the argument why not
mandated private insurance instead. Leaning toward social adequacy re-
duces the frequency of supplementary assistance benefits, but a greater
sense of solidarity is asked from other insured at whose expense this
redistribution takes place. Moreover, it increases the similarity to a
tax/transfer scheme, thus, endangers the property-like claims, destroys
the myth of a "fair return", and heightens the political vulnerability to
arbitrary interventions.
-  Intergenerational redistributions
If one leaves aside for a moment the two types of interpersonal
redistributions discussed before, all redistribution occurring would be
exclusively intertemporal (or intrapersonal) on condition that a complete
stationary state for all relevant parameters existed. Among others, this
would include a zero-growth economy, constant demographic variables,
and "matured" social insurance schemes with fixed beneficiary/worker
ratios and no changes of benefit levels. Since their inception, such a
situation has never been given for any of these schemes. Therefore,
always interpersonal redistributions between insured belonging to
different birth cohorts have taken place, i.e. that succeeding cohorts had
to pay a different "price" for a same amount of benefits or vice versa.
These intergenerational transfers are unavoidable in social insurance
schemes which operate on a pay-as-you-go basis as more or less all of
them do. Only funded schemes which base benefit levels on "defined
contributions" can be actuarially fair on intergenerational terms (however,
they are never completely immune to demographic shifts).
   Social insurance schemes need not to be funded. But they have to
attain an internally balanced budget, and, therefore, pay-as-you-go
financed schemes presuppose structural flexibility on both the revenue
and the benefit axis because originally exogenous factors (like de-
mographic variables, employment level, or economic growth) are
transformed into endogenous elements of their financial viability. The
required flexibility to maintain the solvency of the schemes is ensured by
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demand contributions from them as well as to change eligibility criteria
and benefit levels (Beveridge 1942: 13; Marshall 1975: 56). This entails a
variable relationship between contributions and benefits.
   Intergenerational redistributions are largely irrelevant in unemployment
or sick pay insurance, where positive and negative transfers are confined
to the respective generation of employable age. They are, by definition, of
substantial concern for
old-age pensions and, to a large extent, also for in-kind benefits (health
and long-term care) where generations with a different relationship to the
labor market are tied together. The metapher of the "generational
compact" is a conceptualization of those institutional arrangements that
have to overcome the temporal cleavage of contributing to and receiving
benefits from them. The term is meant to integrate different generations
by appealing to the cohorts of employable age that, if they support the no
longer economically active generation (and in health care the not yet em-
ployed generation as well) according to the prevailing levels of protection,
their contributions generate claims to benefits met by succeeding
generations. Thus, a pay-as-you-go financed public pension scheme im-
plies a revolving build-up and repayment of an implicit debt, and only if
the scheme is abandoned completely there will be a "doomsday"
generation whose claims remain unfulfilled.
   During the phase of non-maturity those old-age insurance programs
had the advantage of immediately "blanketing-in" all elderly people who
have not had the opportunity (or obligation) to lengthy prior contribution
payments. The accruing "windfalls" for the first generations of
beneficiaries helped much to enhance the popularity of social insurances
in the United States after 1939 or in Germany after the fundamental
pension reform of 1957 while, in addition, improved benefit levels and
relaxed eligibility criteria could be enjoyed at a still low burden for the
contributing insured (Hinrichs 1993). Dissatisfaction with the privileges
for certain generations should have been negligible because, to a large
extent, the active contributors were relieved from the obligation to
individually support aged parents. However, by approaching maturity the
internal rate of return of contributions fell for each succeeding cohort,
and due to population aging, implying a deteriorating worker/pensioner
ratio, it can be expected to decline further. Numerous calculations have
been carried out to demonstrate that cohorts who have recently or not yet
entered employable age will even face a negative rate of return: The
benefits they can expect are not worth the rising contributions they are
doomed to pay (for an overview see Leimer 1995). Those calculations,
using private protection as a reference point, highlight a weakness of the
contributory approach which is commonly assumed to be its particular
strength compared to tax-financing: Whereas the various (and partly
"invisible") taxes paid are used for the universe of public spending without
any specific assignment, the explicit connection of revenues and spending
purposes in social insurance schemes (see above) gives cause for an
individual evaluation of the contributory burden in view of expected
benefits.
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seems questionable whether the alternative of private funded provision for
old-age (or health and long-term care) would actually be more attractive
due to the "fallacy of composition" argument (Barr 1993: 217-35; Wagner
1985: 152-3, 158-9). Nevertheless, those results correct the false image of
"earned" benefits because, in fact, contribution payments only qualify to
receive them. And they help to reinforce the already widespread
pessimism among younger workers that contribution rates will go up
further whereas the maintenance of present benefit levels (and age of
retirement eligibility) appears hardly feasible. From an individual
perspective, striving for private provision (insurance) appears to be the
altogether more advantageous and sustainable alternative which also in-
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earnings in a certain way. Hence, instead of binding together different
generations a sense of growing intergenerational inequities occurring
within certain social insurance schemes can give rise to a perspective of
generational cleavages. For the sake of the stability of these schemes
(especially younger) workers in covered employment have to swallow a
variable and, above all, impaired contribution/benefit ratio (in whatever
variant it materializes) for themselves. It includes to acknowledge that
social insurance schemes are not designed to maximize the internal rate
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providing calculable as well as dynamic security under changing
conditions (Wagner 1985: 155, 164). However, to acquire a taste for this
perspective presupposes confidence in the political promise of security.
And, in view of increased contribution rates, they must not fear that
ﬀ ﬁﬃ  - R*)48  ﬁ:* -R%(3":9(? @."ﬃ7&@4 4 -wage labor costs will threaten
their job security.
   Before entering the questions why, despite their inherent interpersonal
redistributions in three dimensions, social insurance schemes have
enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy so far and why these schemes might
possibly lose their unassailable status I will turn to the German statutory
health care insurance where the scope of interpersonal redistributions is
even more pronounced than in other social insurance schemes.
3. Health Insurance Is Different and Even More Ambitious
Health insurance is "different" from other social insurance schemes in
several respects: First of all, health is consistently considered the most
valued "good" and always tops the ranking list of central life-interests
(Statistisches Bundesamt 1994: 438-45) because sickness and accidents
impair the decisive material basis of the freedom to act which conditions
all other individual freedom possible. "Health" is thus the most basic
need. In contrast, old age is not a misfortune and not bearing comparably
dramatic implications for individuals and families: According to an ap-
praisal of the income needed one can individually save for this work-free
phase of life one is regularly hoping to enjoy although the "risk" to outlive
'  5ﬂ%%>4 >4ﬁ ated assets remains. Life insurance contracts or a public
old-age insurance can cover this risk. For a large segment of the labor
force the occurrence of unemployment is a more unforeseeable event.

  

 ;/!( ﬁﬃﬂ &( ﬂ%%&-$"#47Q(35   ( ﬁ:" Gﬂﬁ  "# $ ;  ﬁﬃ  &-"ﬃ75'&  
reservation wage the dependency on substitute resources can be
minimized. But it is completely unforseeable (and individu-
ally almost non-susceptible) whether and when one has to lay claim to
health care benefits. Furthermore, neither the amount of those benefits
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calculable. And whereas a reduction of public pensions or unemployment
benefits down to absolute poverty levels would not instantly cause serious
consequences, no longer granting medically possible benefits according to
need is tantamount to rationing and, due to the fatal effects if one
possibly cannot afford the full range of medical services, would alarm the
currently healthy but virtually eligible persons as well. Therefore,
universal and comprehensive - i.e. medically adequate - health care
coverage is a core element of social protection. Because direct contacts
with the health care system are usually more frequent than with other
social welfare agencies it can be assumed that individual experiences
effectively influence the pub ﬁ:"ﬃ%   % .%& tion of the welfare state and
support for it.
   Except for Denmark, in all OECD countries social insurance
contributions are levied to cover the consequences of poor health. Of
course, in typical "social insurance states" the contribution-financed
share of expenditure is considerably higher than in those countries with a
tax-financed national health system (like the U.K.). Whatever the mix of
revenues, two types of benefits are provided: First, income replacing
benefits are paid to sick em  ﬁ: 2     >/ﬂﬁ#ﬁ <; $>/8":47 V 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(and depending on the length of the period) one finds a combination of
(reduced) wage continuation payments by the employer, social insurance
benefits replacing former wages at a certain percentage, and, sometimes,
waiting days where sick employees themselves have to shoulder the
income loss. Whereas a less than hundred percent replacement of wages
is clearly aimed at lowering the rate of absenteeism, the rationale for em-
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insurance funds and to intensify their endeavors for providing sound
working conditions. For that part of the cash benefits which is financed
out of earnings-related contributions there is no categorical difference to
unemployment insurance benefits.
   Second, medical services are provided (or their costs are reimbursed)
which ease the strain on individual resources due to health-related
expenses. Like other benefits in-kind, they are, in effect, income enlarging
(although, since medical services rarely yield original utility, they rather
represent "loss-compensating benefits"). In all developed countries, public
health care spending is dominated by medical services. In Germany, due
(,   ﬁ:     ﬂ7& %4()"ﬃ>4 tion payment usually expiring after six weeks
of illness, earnings-related cash benefits of the statutory health insurance
system amount to less than eight percent of total expenditure while the
costs of medical treatment make up for almost all the rest.
   It is not necessary here to describe the structural features and
peculiarities of the German statutory health insurance system
(Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung), which covers about 90 percent of the
German population (for details see Hinrichs 1995b: 664-8, with further
references). Most relevant is however that all three types of interpersonal
redistribution discussed above take place here as well and even on an
altogether larger scale.
   (1) The renunciation of experience rating implies a considerable volume
of ex ante vertical and horizontal redistribution, particularly, since
individual health risks vary widely. Even "pre-existing conditions" do not
imply a rejection of chronically ill persons, the exclusion of benefits for
certain diseases, or a higher than the uniform contribution rate.20
Furthermore, the scheme is not immune against attempts to alter the
individual risk status (malinger-
ing, hypochondria and other forms of "over-utilization" resulting from
third-party payment).
   (2) The scope of interpersonal redistribution is increased because family
members (children and spouses) who have no earnings or are only
marginally employed are insured at no extra cost. They are covered under
the scheme of the principal insured who contributes to the sickness
fund.21 From a cross-sectional perspective, this redistribution mainly
occurs on the horizontal level. Longitudinally, to a large extent, this ar-
rangement amounts to an intertemporal, life-cycle redistribution.
   The most important deviation from the principle of individual equity,
however, stems from the fact that funds are allocated and benefits in-kind
are distributed according to a prevailing dualism of principles: The ability
to pay determines the revenue side when earnings between a lower
threshold and a maximum ceiling make up the sole base of calculating
the amount of individual contributions.22 In contrast, all insured are
20      Whereas in the other social insurance schemes the contribution rates are
fixed at a uniform level, in health insurance, actually, the rates vary across the
sickness funds due to the different risk structures of their respective
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an approximately equal package of benefits. Cross-subsidies between sickness
funds in place since 1994 and aimed at to balance risk differentials and
revenue structures have narrowed the range of contribution rates (Hinrichs
1995b: 666, 672). It implies that members of sickness funds which end up with
a negative balance of those cross-subsidies have a larger proportion of their
consequently increased contribution rate used for solidarity purposes than
before.
21      Therefore, more housewives taking up covered employment and a declining
birth rate reduce the volume of this type of interpersonal redistribution. But in
German statutory health insurance former housewives do not gain additional
benefits when they enter employment. In this respect the effects are much the
same as with U.S. Social Security providing spouse benefits: Many employed
women pay contributions which do not materialize in higher public pensions.
22      Insofar, the vertical redistribution aimed at "social balancing" has a cut-off
point when earnings exceeding that ceiling are excluded from participating in
this process. Furthermore, employees with earnings above the contribution
assessment ceiling (1996: DM 6,000 per month in West Germany) are not
compulsorily insured. They can become (remain) voluntary members or opt out
in favor of private health care coverage (if they become/remain voluntary mem-
bers of the statutory health insurance they pay the maximum amount as a
lump-sum contribution based on the prevailing assessment ceiling). The
problem with this provision has always been that these groups can either opt
for the pure self-help principle (i.e. going private) or the solidarity principle
(voluntary members) whatever appears to be more beneficial for them, e.g. in
view of their family size or "pre-existing conditions".
equally entitled to medical service benefits, which are in no way related to
the length or amount of previous contributions. Utilization exclusively de-
pends on medical need and is, in principle, unlimited.23 This dualism of
differentiated contributions and always medically adequate benefits (or:
complete dissociation between the amount paid and consumed) makes
this scheme morally more demanding than the other branches of social
insurance due to the vertical interpersonal redistributions it entails.24
   It also gave rise to the question whether the term "insurance" is really
appropriate and contributions to the German statutory health insurance
actually represent a proportional earmarked tax (on certain kinds of
income) with an upper cap. A weak and not fully convincing argument in
favor of a conceptualization as a social
insurance scheme is that for high-wage employees the medical services
received are of greater worth to them because they help to restore or
maintain a higher earnings capacity (Schmähl 1985).
   (3) Intergenerational redistribution occurs between employed and re-
tired persons: In principle, pensioners remain members of the same
sickness fund they belonged to before retirement and they continue to
pay contributions. These are calculated on the basis of their (normally)
lower public retirement benefits. One-half of the contribution is deducted
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transferred by the public pension agency. Because the elderly are dis-
proportionate "consumers" of health care benefits, the re (3"#6 &4 @ﬂQ 
total expenditure of the statutory sickness funds is decreasingly covered
by their contributions (at present, less than 40 percent25), but, effectively,
these contributions are as well predominantly borne by the economically
23      When "need" comes into play in health care it is clearly "demonstrated
need". But it has to be distinguished between the proof of a lack of means and
the medically determined need of treatment. While the gate-keeping function of
the medical profession remains unaffected, the costs of medical treatment as
such are covered as a matter of right and no means-test applies. However, the
statutory scheme in Germany contains an interesting "means-test":
Copayments are subject to ceilings on their total amount per year (depending
on income level - Überforderungsklausel) and to exemptions (mainly for children
and persons below a certain income threshold - Sozialklausel). In effect, these
"stop-loss" provisions imply higher benefits for the poorer part of the sick
covered by contributions of the collectivity of insured. At the same time, the
more
well-off patients are demanded to bear the full amount of these out-of-pocket
payments.
24      This redistributional effect at the cost of high-wage earners (if one
disregards individual earnings mobility over the life-course) is moderated by the
well known fact, that the middle classes consume a disproportionate share of
social benefits in kind (TEK 1981: 62-79; Goodin/LeGrand 1987: esp. Ch. 10).
The "beneficial involvement" of the non-poor can be assumed to make them
interested in maintaining or improving the quality of services or level of
benefits.
active who pay into the public pension funds and not by the pensioners
themselves.
   This type of redistribution which, viewed from a cohort perspective, is
not merely intertemporal is continuously on the increase: In 1970 the
average contribution rate stood at 8.2 percent (and the assessment ceiling
was DM 1,200 per month, which is one fifth of to $ 2   ﬁ#
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substantial part of the risen contribution rate (at present 13.5 percent)
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disease" factors of the labor-intensive medical sector as well as to
strategies of health care providers and increased aspirations of the
insured propelling demand for and costs of health care services. But a
non-negligible part is due to advances in medical technology. These
innovations were mainly to the benefit of elderly patients. Hence, the
present elderly have contributed to the health insurance scheme at much
lower rates and comparatively small total contribution amounts (but
nothing more was expected from them during their working lives) while
enjoying an improved level of medical services during their retirement,
implying considerable positive life-time transfers.26 Since the share of
retired persons is continuously on the rise as well as is life expectancy of
the elderly (i.e. a prolonged retirement phase) further increases of the
contribution rate are inevitable. Having in mind the reservations against
"money worth" analyses, it has been shown that all cohorts born after
1960/1970 will make payments to the statutory health insurance larger
than the present value of their life-time benefits (Schulenburg 1989;
Behrens 1991). The degree of intergenerational inequity would come out
to be even higher if future advances in medical technology and an
inflation rate of health care benefits constanly exceeding the development
of gross wages were taken into account.27
25      It means that about one third of the contribution rate of the economically
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26      Insofar, the recently introduced long-term care insurance, meant to
complete the social insurance system, is very similar: It involves new types of
benefits and a changed mode of financing, and will nearly treble the previous
volume of public (hitherto: largely means-tested) expenditure on long-term care
after complete implementation. This institutional innovation contains re-
distributional provisions analogous to those occurring in health care insurance,
namely, (1) a legally fixed uniform contribution rate of 1.7 percent levied up to
the same earnings ceiling, (2) no extra contribution for non-employed family
members, graduated benefits for domiciliary and nursing home care solely ac-
cording to the need of the frail person (although the benefits are not completely
needs-oriented: due to an upper limit on each of the three grades they do not in
any case cover the full costs of professional care). (3) Persons already in need of
long-term care are immediately eligible for full benefits from this unfunded
scheme which amounts to considerable "windfalls" for the elderly generation of
today (for more details, see Hinrichs 1995a).
27      However, if the more recent birth cohorts were equally allowed to take
4. Health Care Insurance - the Attitudes of the Insured
The patterns of "social balancing" and ex ante as well as intergenerational
redistribution reflect the logic of solidarity in German statutory health
insurance, and the emanating interpersonal redistributions far beyond a
pure insurance model are politically intendend or, in case of unequal
treatment of different birth cohorts, are considered unavoidable. But
young, male, healthy, single, and high-wage earners have to acknowledge
that these redistributive mechanisms operate at their disadvantage.
   Proposals aimed at a reduction of the redistribute effects have been
brought forward by actors adhering to a market liberal doctrine. They
play a more or less prominent role in the ongoing reform debate (Hinrichs
1995b: 674-9): (1) Introducing or increasing copayments and deductibles
are advocated as means to fight "over-utilization" (moral hazard behavior)
and to reduce the volume of collectively financed health care. At the same
time, these changes would partly reindividualize the financial
consequences of health risks and hence curtail the effectiveness of the
components of solidary redistribution. Excluding benefits for diseases
which are contingent upon individual behavior or levying surcharges for
risky (mis-)behavior ("malus model") would also help to approximate
contributions and individual risk status which are diverging due to the
uniform contribution rate. An equivalent strategy, also bearing a
regressive impact, would be to refund a certain percentage of contri-
butions if no benefits had been claimed over a defined period of time
("bonus model"). (2) The abolition of free insurance for non-employed
(adult) family members or a lowered ceiling of earnings liable to
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volume of "social balancing". (3) Finally, a partial funding of the public
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catalogue of covered benefits or not to include new, costly medical
therapies are proposed in order to curtail intergenerational redistribution.
And extending the contributory base of pensioners to all income sources
would immediately make the elderly pay a greater share of their health
care consumption.
   It can be assumed that those insured who are aware of their high-risk
status (e.g. the chronically ill) or due to their constant low earnings can
expect to be "net beneficiaries" will readily accept this scheme and do not
want to see it changed in the direction of more "insurance". But for what
reasons should the other insured without such self-interested motives
advantage of medical progress like their predecessors their life-time
contributions would not necessarily surmount the value of benefits received.
Then the accumulative process would shift the increased intergenerational
burden to the succeeding birth cohorts.
stand loyal to the present arrangement? A number of plausible
arguments can be brought forward which are conducive to broad popular
support. I want to list them first before I will present conceivable reasons
why acquiescence and support might become endangered. Then these
arguments are evaluated in view of empirical results gained from
quantitative and qualitative interviews.
   The German welfare state presents itself to the public as an
extraordinary complex, diversified and unintelligible institutional
arrangement. Such a perception has been confirmed by an officially
appointed commission which was not able to ascertain conclusive results
on the overall distributional effects of the multitude of positive and
negative transfers (TEK 1981). Zacher (1987: 594-5) turns this complexity
into a positive argument when he speaks of the "blessing of
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position in the distributional game and an evaluation of whether
proclaimed aims of social justice are actually achieved. Thus, a complex
structure also of financing permits a higher level of resources to be
extracted from individual incomes. The "ignorant support" might be
reinforced by the useful illusion ﬀ()@ &ﬀ ﬁﬃ 2-   @ ﬂ-+() ()@4  ﬂ%"#!ﬁ
insurance schemes which does not appear on the pay cheque. It hides the
true costs of social security (TEK 1981: 244).28
   Furthermore, the long standing existence of social insurance schemes
produces formative effects, i.e. experiences and expectations of continuity
which largely exclude positive answers to questions like "how could it be
different?" or "what would be the alternative?". Thus, insofar as these
institutions are deeply entrenched and commonly perceived as an unchal-
lenged "matter of course" in social life, social insurance schemes and
health care insurance in particular deliver what the "product" of any
insurance is, namely, to provide information on the security of future life
situations (or normal conditions) and not just to compensate for actually
suffered losses (Kaufmann 1973: 254, 300-4, 314). If social security for
oneself and others is taken for granted the need to bother about details is
reduced. It also means to refrain from actively gathering complete
information on the working of social insurance schemes. Rudimentary
knowledge promotes notions of self-help, reciprocal relationships, re-
distribution over the life cycle etc. and thus consolidates the myth of an
"insurance" analogy.
   Whereas the above arguments refer to a habitual or passive pattern of
28      The German statutory sickness funds use a "contract model" in which
services rendered to patients are supplied in kind. It enhances the "hiding
effect" because the insured have no exact information on the money value of the
benefits received and, hence, cannot calculate whether it matches the amount
of contributions paid and, thus, private insurance is possibly more
advantageous. Further-
more, it removes the incentive to retreat to "over-utilization" if unavoidable
contributions exceed the amount of hitherto received benefits.
support or (cognitive) indifference, the legitimacy of interpersonal
redistributions according to the types ascertained in the two previous
sections is dependent on a conscious acknowledgement of social norms
and moral intuitions which have led to the incorporation of the respective
provisions. Without corresponding moral dispositions these
redistributions become a potential source of conflict and compulsory
social insurance as such precarious. The necessary "culture of solidarity"
was build up and became entrenched in the course of welfare state devel-
opment and stabilized its institutions. However, the behavioral orientation
to comply with norms of social justice and ethical standards and, hence,
setting aside narrow self-interests cannot be enforced. It rather has to be
confirmed and revived by discoursive justification of principles embedded
in programs and their respective provisions and by reccurent appeals to
moral intuitions and obligations which, when adhered to, would
contribute to social integration. The post-war compromise on the concept
of "social market economy" was the ideological (and largely consented)
platform for political parties (at least, the two large Volksparteien) and
other collective actors to promote the culture of solidarity in a Sozialstaat
(which is the German version of a constitutionally vested welfare state).29
   Since health (care) is "special" (see above) one can presume that the
culture of solidarity is most effective (and resistant to erosion) in this
branch of the social insurance system. If the involved redistributive
provisions lose their plausibility the support for other schemes should be
eroded even further. One can distinguish two complementary strands of
arguments why the tolerance for interpersonal redistributions and the
support for statutory health care insurance is diminishing.
   (a) It can hardly be ascertained whether the adherence to principles of
solidarity was stronger or more common in the past. However, the
ongoing processes of individualization have reduced the biographical
relevance of traditional social institutions, dissolved social milieus, and
lead to a greater heterogeneity of life situations. Welfare state activities
(notably education) have contributed to this process. Hence, an
unconditional commitment to norms of solidarity and other inculcated
duties can no longer be expected while the definition and formation of
common interests are harder to overcome. Having more options and being
pressed to deliberately de %"#$B'4    ": 7-R @  $ﬂ  (   !8  ﬁﬃﬃﬂ
state institutions from being approached strategically in view of individual
utility, especially since they no longer (if ever) convey a sense of com-
munity (Gemeinschaft) emanating from occupational, class or local
affiliation when they nowadays cover almost the whole population and are
29      The juridification (Verrechtlichung) of claims of the insured emanating from
section 20 of the German Basic Law (sozialer Bundesstaat) and related
decisions of the Constitutional Court have to be regarded as an effective barrier
against political interventions. It guarantees a comparatively greater stability of
social protection than in a number of other European countries.
perceived as large, anonymous, bureaucratic entities. It is possible that
the subjective appraisal of "costs" and "benefits" leads to
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intransparency"). If it turns out unfavorable - not the least, because the
value of the promise of "security" is generally underestimated as against
the perception of negative transfers - the legitimacy of embedded prin-
ciples could be questioned and support withdrawn.
   (b) Since the guarantee of "security" is the central product of social
insurance schemes it is important that on part of the insured stable
expectations on the continuity of this promise and the future "price" one
has to pay for it exist. Confidence in the stability of these institutional
arrangements could be shaken by simple common sense considerations:
Foremost due to high unemployment contribution rates have been
increased several times while the level of benefits and access to them were
curtailed. The possibilities of further increases in order to cope with the
aging process, advances in medical technology etc. appear limited
especially since, in view of economic globalization, the need to reconstruct
and streamline the system of social security is emphasized time and again
in the public discourse. And the consequences of frozen contribution
rates on the benefit quality are easy to recognize by everyone.30 Under
these circumstances, reforms which are proclaimed to "stabilize" the
respective schemes might be suspected to infringe on expectations of
"security": Social risks which were believed to be firmly redressed at high
levels re-emerge as uncertainties due to "rule instability" which is one
aspect of what Lindbeck (1994) calls "policy-induced risks".31 If
instrumental concerns are no longer displaced by "a healthy dose of
ritualism and conservatism" (Offe 1996: 200) fading confidence in the
guarantee of "security" is likely to prompt reflections on the distributional
principles of social insurance schemes and, in anticipation of further
deteriorations, on alternative modes of protection, hence, leading to
diminishing loyalty. This situation corresponds to the prerequisites for
continuing an assurance game: It works as long as the expectation
prevails that the future will be like the past; otherwise an accelerating
30      The recently implemented long-term care insurance in Germany is
designed to operate on a fixed contribution rate. In view of rising numbers of
beneficiaries (due to population aging) and foreseeable price increases of
professional care a restricted budget implies a declining real value of benefits so
that the needs of frail people will be met to an ever lower degree (Hinrichs
1995a).
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pleasure: The introduction of a social benefit (like health care) should have
generated pleasure because a discomforting life-situation was changed for the
better. When its existence is simply "taken for granted" this experience is
superseded by comfort. Attention is renewed when (potential) beneficiaries
become aware that cuts or other deteriorations are at stake which arouse fears
of an imminent state of discomfort.
breakdown of the game is initiated. Therefore, effectively upholding the
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an additional challenge of the welfare state (defenders).
   One significant finding from our interviews with employed members of
the statutory sickness funds is that almost all respondents emphasized
the importance of being amply protected against the vicissitudes and
contingencies related to their health.32 Mandatory insurance is welcomed
for autopaternalistic reasons, and there are only very few objections to
earnings-related financing of needs-based benefits. The answers of the in-
sured confirm that the present public arrangement can still maintain the
secure expectation of having equal access to competent and adequate
medical treatment at any time and even in the long run.33
   Most of the insured interviewed were generally content with the range of
benefits, the level of contributions and the system as a whole.34 They want
comprehensive, high quality benefits and are willing to pay for them.
Despite the fact that the health care system is a central feature in nearly
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amount of monthly contributions) and details of entitlement are not
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(see also Alber/Ryll 1990; Kaufmann 1973: 284-5), however, in most
cases it is absolutely sufficient in view of decisions they can or have to
make. Insofar, the insured persons show a rational behavior in acquiring
information.
   Although it can hardly be factually true most persons believe they are
"net contributors" to the system (due to their earnings level, their good
health in past and present, or not having a large family insured free of
charge) and generally accept this subjectively assumed imbalance of
benefits and contributions. Extreme risk aversion is at the bottom of one
cluster of answers: Here the constant threat to fall ill precludes any
32      The report of the study "Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung und
sozialpolitische Kultur" (financed by grants from the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft) which is based on seventy-four qualitative interviews
will be published in 1997 (co-authors: Karl Hinrichs, Claus Offe, and Carsten
G. Ullrich). Lack of space prevents me from quoting interview passages which
would provide an enriched picture of the (non-)compliance of the insured with
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33      This optimistic assessment we found in 1993 when the interviews where
carried out should no longer be accurate. Annually conducted surveys applying
identical questions clearly demonstrate a quite dramatic decline of positive
	 
C K IHK
N[D1E F D

D6E

W F L
  
-being as well as of the satisfaction with the political
system after 1993. Perceptions of future insecurity and mistrust in the
robustness of the social security system and the political manageability of
problems have grown in 1994 and again in 1995 (Forschungsschwerpunkt
Sozialer Wandel 1996).
34      This result has been repeatedly confirmed by representative quantitative
surveys (Rinne/Wagner 1995; MAGS 1995: 64-72).
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being comprehensively insured stands above any other consideration.35
Another cluster of reasons refers to the desirability of benefits: Classifying
oneself as a "net contributor" within the statutory scheme does not imply
that other members take advantage of a service one would prefer to
obtain as well. On the contrary, one is not concerned with striking a more
balanced account (in con (3-R (/(3 ﬂ  %ﬂ()" butions to the public pension
scheme). The benefits of the health care system are necessarily associated
with a negative - being sick and suffering from this condition. Besides
being glad not to be a "net beneficiary" now but, realizing future selves,
possibly later in life, ap  
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occurring redistributions rests on the normatively based and explicitly
mentioned acknowledgement of the prevailing principle of solidarity: All
through it is considered legitimate that insured with low earnings (and/or
family members without income) are not denied full medical coverage be-
cause they are unable to pay higher contributions.
   Most persons interviewed reject the idea of surcharges for persons who
expose themselves to increased "everyday risks" (like smoking or
malnutrition) as either not justified or suitable (to change individual
behavior) and support the status quo: Oneself and everyone else should
have unrestricted access to a comprehensive set of health care services
when it is needed. Although the primacy of distributing benefits according
to medical need is almost never put into question, nearly all respondents
are aware of the fact that "over-utilization" takes place in different
variants and they regret it. Very often, this goes along with demands for
political interventions to obviate this behavior and restore "solidary
discipline". Likewise, those who have left the statutory health insurance
in order to save contributions should not be given the opportunity to slip
back under the "roof" of solidarity.
   One crucial question, however, is whether the contributions paid for
collective health care are considered too high. Survey research shows that
about one-third of the population thinks that health insurance
contributions are too high (Dehlinger/Brennecke 1992: 239-41; Rin-
ne/Wagner 1995: 17-9). Findings from our own empirical research do not
35      Only few insured who had the opportunity to choose from sickness funds
with different contribution rates had actually changed to a "cheaper" fund in
order to reduce their (avoidable) share of "solidarity payments". Inertia, custom,
and the (unjustified) fear to possibly experience less generous treatment when
giving up long-standing membership were the most frequent arguments for not
taking options or not even comparing contribution rates. Since 1996 all
(potential) members of the statutory health insurance are allowed to choose
from nearly all sickness funds. Despite extensive reports in all mass media and
concrete advice given how to individually save up to one thousand Deutsch-
mark per year by simply moving to another sickness fund, so far, only a very
small percentage of members of sickness funds asking an above-average
contribution rate has chosen a "cheaper" one.
confirm this, however. Past increases in the contribution rate have been
tolerated as largely justified, and even further increases would not be met
with much resistance as long as the health care system is considered
efficacious and efficient. However, many interviewees mention concrete
possibilities to save on expenditure, chiefly those which would affect
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more readily accepted than the prospect of curtailed benefits. This is
hardly surprising because removing a benefit is felt as a greater loss than
never having been entitled to it in the first place. Furthermore, it would
imply a reduced potential return for already made contributions. But
most important should be that contributions and benefits are of
differential significance for the respective group of payers and recipients:
For the contributors the monthly payment represents a small part of their
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resources or, in case of health care, is of really vital importance.
Therefore, it is the level of benefits that matters most for factual and
potential recipients alike and not so much the contribution rate. Although
a few persons interviewed supported the idea of copayments for certain
benefits as a proper means to contain costs, their extension is generally
regarded as a curtailment of benefits and is widely
criticized.36 As out-of-pocket costs, copayments are perceived as more
troublesome than the automatic deduction of (increased) contributions
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opment), those quasi-curtailments are sure to heighten mistrust in the
statutory scheme to deliver all medically necessary benefits.
5. Conclusion
Do the empirical results presented in the previous section imply that
there is no reason to worry about institutional destabilization? First of all,
they show a limited explanatory power of "rational actor" models. Certain
political cultures, institutional settings as well as continuous discoursive
confirmation of ideas, values and traditions incorporated in redistributive
institutions are suitable for promoting reflexions on the consequences of
pursuing "interests" in view of certain "norms". At the same time, this
36      The level of copayments and other forms of cost-sharing by patients is still
comparatively low in Germany (OECD 1995: 16-7). Nevertheless, results from a
recent representative survey show that no more than 6 percent of the adult
population in West Germany favors a further extension of copayments further,
whereas 41 percent consider the existing provisions as already too excessive.
Similarly, 80 percent oppose the idea of decreasing the contribution rate in
response to intensified copayments (Jung 1995: 17-8; for comparable results
see MAGS 1995: 124-42).
would explain different "levels" of the culture of solidarity or prevailing
visions of distributive justice among countries.
   In Germany, and here related to the very "special" but nevertheless
"ambitious" statutory health insurance, that moral infrastructure has
been preserved despite advanced processes of individualization. The
widespread acceptance of the present health care system partly stems
from "institutional fatalism" in which, over time, the basic (formal) rules
and their redistributive implications developed a hegemonic, almost
natural normative status and thus assure habitual loyalties and
uncontested support. In this case, the culture of solidarity is less visible
but not absent, and the legitimacy of welfare state institutions and their
redistributive impact still depends on a continued reproduction of these
(latent) cultural norms.
   Most persons are willing to accept the normative obligation to practise
solidarity and support the present arrangement and its financial
consequences. They reject proposals aimed at to restrict the magnitude of
interpersonal redistribution within the health insurance system (see
beginning of section 4.; cf. MAGS 1995: 100-23 and 135-42). And, related
to the German social security system as a whole, a fundamental
restructuring of the system that places a higher priority on individual
responsibility would not be in accord with the preferences of most of the
population (Dehlinger/Brennecke 1992; Roller 1996). Although no
mandate exists for certain political elites to pursue a far-reaching
reorganization, substantial changes to this central element of the German
welfare state are already enacted or presently dealt with in the legislative
process. The direction is quite obvious: restriction of covered benefits, less
uniform and universal access to medical care, social rationing, and partial
assimilation of the statutory scheme to principles employed in private
sickness insurance. Since corresponding proposals cannot be im-
plemented at once, these issues will remain on the agenda, at least as
long as the protagonists of "lean welfare" dominate public discourse and
strategically disseminate a bleak interpretation of the future of social
policy if there would not be a decisive departure from the "vested rights"
attitude. But independent of the success of the "more self-reliance" ide-
ology, it is indeed questionable to stick to the employment-centeredness
of social security in a post-full employment economy and in an aging
society after central normalcy assumptions (on life courses and family
patterns) have become obsolete.
   These developments already give rise to concerns about institutional
destabilization which are intensified by the fact, repeatedly demonstrated
for U.S. Social Security, that support and confidence are at odds
(Friedland 1994). Our interview results and those from survey research
clearly show that the large majority of the insured (the population) prefers
comprehensive coverage of medical benefits (MAGS 1995: 130-3; FORSA
1996). But, at the same time, about two thirds of the respondents in a
recent representative survey fear that very soon the statutory sickness
funds cannot provide comprehensive coverage for all insured because it
becomes "too expensive" (FORSA 1996), indicating an awareness of
imminent deteriorations.
   The reduced commitment of certain collective actors, notably the
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hence, further destabilize expectations about the continuance and proper
performance of the health care scheme. On the one hand, it would
improve the prospects of the protagonists of extended market
mechanisms that large parts of the insured fatalistically put up with a
gradual reindividualization of health risks. On the other hand, another
part would perceive that opting for private insurance is more advanta-
geous or additional private coverage appears to become necessary.37 This
is exactly the group of insured who can afford protection outside the
statutory scheme and on whose unquestioned normative recognition of
the ongoing interpersonal redistributions and solidary contributions the
statutory health insurance is crucially dependent. If they are no longer
politically encouraged to adhere to norms of solidarity a morally
ambitious social institution such as statutory health insurance makes
less and less "sense" to them and once curbed "opportunistic" modes of
behavior gain the upper hand. Then the remaining majority should have
more reasons to be anxious about the unconditional promise to deliver
benefits based solely on medical need.
37      Some lessons can be drawn from the German public pension system: The
structural reform of 1992 will hold the contribution rate in check without
affecting present and future pensioners excessively. But it obviously has not
reversed the decline of confidence in the stability of the system and the future
adequacy of pension benefits. Younger persons, clearly afraid of massive future
deteriorations (Jung 1995: 20), have responded to the perceived insecurity and
have enhanced their private savings efforts to provide for old age (Hinrichs
1993).
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